Reason and Morality

In a book awash with empirical data and analysis, it is remarkable that Pinker’s capstone explanation (developed on pp. 647-650) is not based solely on empirical facts. Historians and psychologists will scrutinize Pinker’s empirical claims. Here I discuss his crucial philosophical argument, which I think faces some serious problems. Pinker’s argument recalls many similar efforts by modern philosophers since Immanuel Kant to develop a rigorous case for morality. Henry’s claim is logically consistent as long as he agrees that, were their positions reversed, Peter would have a right to harm Henry and Henry would not have a right to harm Peter. If morality requires treating everyone equally, then it’s wrong to privilege, say, my spouse, children, friends, or neighbors over others. A similar problem arises from a famous line of thought developed and endorsed by Peter Singer (who, as we noted, influenced Pinker’s ethical ideas). We all agree that it would be morally wrong not to pull a drowning child from a nearby lake, even if that meant ruining a suit of clothes worth, say, $500. Both of these conclusions—that it’s wrong to try to save my wife and wrong for a well-off couple to spend $500 on an anniversary dinner—are counter-intuitive. But they seem to follow from Pinker’s assumption that “you can’t favor members of your own group [family, neighborhood, country, etc.] over members of another group.” At a minimum, then, this key assumption of Pinker’s argument from reason to morality requires a lot more support than he gives it. If, as I suspect, this support can’t be provided, then we may have to accept that morality has its roots more in feeling than in reason.